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CONTENTS 1 Introduction
We report on the steganalysis of a stego algorithm developed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), called the NRL method. The steganalysis was done by the Center for Secure Information Systems (CSIS) at George Mason University (GMU). NRL provided CSIS with images, which they then analyzed. CSIS was not able to determine if an image was a "clean" cover image, or a "suspect" stego image. The NRL method is a variant of the well-known least significant bit (LSB) hiding technique [3] . The NRL method is not robust against compression, nor in its elementary form is it robust against noise. The NRL method is used to demonstrate that a small enough embedded message can be hidden, without the steganography being detected.
The steganalysis performed by CSIS is based on investigative techniques being developed at CSIS for targeting open-source and commercial steganography software tools and algorithms. This task involves investigating techniques employed for steganography and the resulting stego media to determine if any stego signatures can be readily detected. ' We also use this report to showcase some statistical stego detection techniques developed by CSIS.
Steganography
We give a brief description of still image-based steganography. The cover image is the image in which we do the hiding. The embedded message is what we hide, via the (steganographic or) stego algorithm or method. Note that the embedded message need not be an image. In fact, in the NRL method the message is ASCII text (including the Unix line feed "Oa"). The stego image is the cover image with the embedded image "in it." The extracted message is what we extract from the stego image by reversing the stego algorithm. The extracted message need not be exactly the same as the embedded image. The acceptable quality level depends on the usage and data type [5] . For the NRL method, no errors are tolerated (the NRL method can be modified, by using error correcting codes, to deal with loss of fidelity). Also, the stego method may or may not use a "key," referred to as the stego key.
The NRL method discussed here uses a stego key. For key based steganography, the steganography should not be detectable without the key. Recall that in steganography the thrust is to keep hidden the very existence of the embedded message. Once an eavesdropper knows that there is a hidden message, the steganography has failed. Of course, by only embedding encrypted messages, one could make the hidden message unintelligible to the eavesdropper. However, that is an issue of cryptography ---the steganography is still considered to have failed.
1 Stego signature -Steganography media signatures include characteristics or patterns introduced to carrier media based on the impact of using steganography techniques to hide information in digital media. We stress that a stego key is not necessary. This may seem to go against the nature of Kerchoffs' principle [1] , which is a mainstay of cryptography. If one wishes to determine whether a given image is a stego image or not, and they have knowledge of the stego algorithm, then the determination is trivial. However, steganography differs from cryptography in that we might be attempting to determine which images are stego images from a set of millions of images (such as image postings on the Web, or on USENET BBDs). In that case, even with knowledge of the stego algorithm, the task is still daunting.
2.1
Kurak & McHugh One of the simplest methods of image-based steganography is that of swapping the least significant bits (LSBs) of the cover image, with the most significant bits (MSBs) of the embedded message. This method is discussed in detail in [3] .
2.2
NRL Method The Kurak & McHugh method of steganography is easily detectable because entire bit planes have been swapped. The NRL method hides much less data, but is also much less detectable. The NRL method hides a maximum of 249 ASCII characters in either a greyscale or a color image (a spatially realized TIFF file) that have minimum dimensions of 500 x 500. A stego key is randomly generated of length 1000. The key is made up of 1000 unique tuples, where each tuple is of the form (xi,yj) where both x and yj are integers in the range 0 to 499. (Thus, one sees why both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the image must be at least 500.) The stego key gives us 1000 image coordinates in terms of pixel values. We used the "xv" software for our image processing. For an M x N image in xv, the x values run from left to right ( to M-1), and the y values run from top to bottom ( to N-1). We only deal with a spatially realized image, so we are using the bitmap representation. We save our files in uncompressed TIFF format.
Given an ASCII character we break it up into four 2-bit pairs as follows: if the ASCII characters byte representation is (b 1 Our embedded message has a maximum length of 249. We always append a stop signal to the information carrying part of the message.
The stop signal is the four 2-bit pairs (0,O), (0,O), (0,O), (0,O). In other words, the stop sequence is the four 2-bit pair decomposition of the null symbol. A pixel coordinate (xi,yj) has an RGB value (Rij ,Bij ,Gij ). Of course if the image is greyscale all three colors have the same value. Each color value is given by a byte (i.e., an integer 0 to 255).
We concentrate our effort on the red value Rij. We swap the two least significant bits (LSBs) of Rij with a two bit pair from an ASCII character if the image is color, and we swap every color's two LSBs if the image is greyscale. The stego key tells us what order to change the pixels in for the stego embedding, and how to read them out for the stego extraction. We treat color and greyscale differently because for a greyscale the three colors must all have the same value or else the steganography will be obvious. For a color image we only change the red value to minimize the changes to the cover image with the intent of making the steganography as hidden as possible. The algorithm is as follows.
1-Take an ordered ASCII text message up to 249 characters.
2-Break each character up into four ordered 2-bit pairs as discussed above. Thus, we now have an ordered message of up to 996 2-bit pairs.
3-For the first tuple in the stego key replace the two LSBs of the red (all colors) byte of that pixel with the first 2-bit pair from the ordered message if the image is color (greyscale). For the second tuple in the stego key, replace the two LSBs of the corresponding pixel byte value(s) with the next two bit pair, the same for the third and fourth tuples from the stego key. At this point we have embedded the first ASCII character into the cover image. If there is a second ASCII character we use the fifth tuple from the stego key. We keep doing this until all the n ASCII (n <250) characters have been embedded into the cover image.
4-Once this is done we use the 4n+1, 4n+2, 4n+3, and 4n+4 tuple coordinates to embed the null sequence into the cover image in the same manner as above.
We have now replaced the cover image with the stego image. The stego image has at most a difference of 1000 pixel values with that of the cover image. That is no more than 0.4% of the pixels have been changed, and if the pixel has been changed it is only in the 2 LSBs. The differences are only in the 2 LSBs of the red byte (all color's bytes) value if the image is color (greyscale). These changes are not noticeable to the human visual system (HVS) for a "good" cover image. 2 For any steganographic method one should only use "good" cover images.
The stego extraction simply reverses the processes, extracting each ASCII character out in four 2-bit pairs. The stego key indicates which pixels to compose the characters from and in what order to do it. When the extraction process reaches the null character the extraction is complete and the extracted message is the same as the embedded message.
We contend that it is extremely difficult to detect this NRL method of steganography. The remainder of this report backs that claim.
Methodology
This section describes the approach taken in reviewing the media provided by NRL by CSIS.
Assumptions and Constraints
A study of the steganography described above was done to determine if the NRL method has characteristics that produce detectable signatures.
The following assumptions and constraints apply: * The steganography tool used to create the stego image was not made available to CSIS for analysis or to produce known cover/stego media pairs for analysis. Therefore, the analysis performed by CSIS was limited to the images (the carrier images) provided by NRL for investigation. CSIS was tasked to determine which images were in fact stego images and which were benign cover images.
* However, after the initial testing the method (not the tool itself) was revealed to CSIS, but the NRL method could still not be detected. Of course CSIS was not given cover image-stego image pairs. In other words CSIS was tasked to perform blind detection. Neither was CSIS given the stego keys. This would be the best that an informed eavesdropper could hope for.
Detecting a Steganography Signature---General Approach
Identifying steganography signatures is based on assessing combinations of carrier, stego media, embedded message, and steganography tools known by the analyst. One must look for characteristics or patterns based on the impact the steganography tools have on the digital media used to hide information. These characteristics may be used to identify the use of steganography in a system and to identify the modified media. This portion of the analysis involves identifying recurring characteristics or patterns produced by the steganography software and is one of the most time consuming activities.
The steps typically used by CSIS to analyze existing steganography tools includes: 1. Obtaining a collection of carriers without information embedded within them (we will call this the set of original carriers). 3 2. Hiding information in the various carriers using a steganography tool to produce stego media files (this is the set of original carriers that now contain hidden information). 3. Performing a number of tests against the stego media to determine if a pattern can be detected.
Since the tools used to hide information may not be available, step 2 above may not be viable. The objective of analyzing the stego media is to find a pattern that can be detected without requiring an original for inspection. 4 At this point our options for determining signatures involve visual inspection and determining if statistical anomalies exist.
Identifying Steganography Signature
Identifying steganography signatures is based on assessing combinations of carrier, stego media, embedded message, and steganography tools known by the analyst. In this experiment, only the stego media is provided for evaluation. Discovering signatures in stego media relies on other understanding the analysts have with respect to tools and techniques for hiding information as well as the associated stego signatures.
In making comparisons with numerous images, patterns begin to emerge as possible signatures of steganography software. Some of these signatures may be exploited automatically to identify the existence of hidden messages and even the tools used to embed the messages. With this knowledge base, if the cover images are not available for comparison (as in the NRL tests), the derived known signatures are enough to imply the existence of a message and identify the tool used to embed the message.
The approaches used in analyzing the images provided by NRL are visual inspection and statistical analysis. In some cases these techniques can be employed to identify the tools used to hide information, in other cases, these detection techniques may simply be used to identify suspicious characteristics. The following 16 images were provided by NRL. Image not shown Figure 3 .10: testlO.tif Figure 3 .11: testll.tif Figure 3 .12: testl2.tif V~~~~~~~~~~I Figure 3 .13: testl3.tif Figure 3 .14: testl4.tif Figure 3 .15: testl5.tif 
NRL Images
The above sixteen TiFF format images in Figure 3 .1 through Figure 3 .16 were provided by NRL for steganalysis. These images are 24-bit TIFF images with dimensions 500 pixels in width by 500 pixels in height with the following exceptions: test8.tif -792 pixels in width by 528 pixels in height testi 1 .tif -720 pixels in width by 576 pixels in height test12.tif -776 pixels in width by 552 pixels in height testl5.tif-576 pixels in width by 720 pixels in height 4
TIFF Files
The images files provided by NRL were all TIFF. No compression was used when saving the images in TIFF format to assure that the lower bits were not over written. This section describes the structural elements of a TIFF file using the image in Figure 3 .2 as an example. In this section we will be looking at the digital and hexadecimal representation of the image in Figure 3 .2: test2.tif.
F e ., . 
Structure of a TIFF File
A TIFF file always begins with either ll*[NULL] or MM[N1TLL]* followed by a 32-bit value that is the offset position for the image file directory (ID), which contains information about the image such as height, width, depth, number of color planes, and type of data compression. 5 No compression was used in the test images. The header for the data in Figure 4 .17 begins at offset 00 and ends with the byte at offset 07. The 1FD offset position is identified as OB71B8 by the last four bytes of the file header. The 1FD begins at offset B71B8 (or at the 750,008'h byte of the file). In the image test2.tif ( Figure 3 .2) the IFD follows the image raster data (raster data is "what you see" on the screen. It is the data values that actually produce the visible image). 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 06 00 03 00 00
00 01 00 02 00 00 01 OE 00 02 00 00 00 07 00 OB © * 04 P .
000B7200:
72 78 01 11 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 08 01 i2 rx©4 * © ©O:
000B7210: 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 15 00 03 00 00
00 01 00 03 00 00 01 16 00 03 00 00 00 01 01 F4 V 0-I cof 000B7230: 00 00 01 17 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 OB 71 B0 01 1A © 0 * © dgq.:_
000B7240:
00 05 00 00 00 01 00 OB | 72 80 01 1B 00 05 00 00
000B7250: 00 01 00 OB 72 88 01 1C 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 01 0 KrdaL 0 © 000B7260: 00 00 01 28 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 ©(
00 00 00 08 00 08 00 08 57 41 4E 47 5A 02 00 00 a a WANGZ@ 000B7280:
12 CO 00 00 00 04 00 00 12 CO 00 00 00 04 00 00 IL In this image, fifteen fields (or tags) are used to further define the IFD. These fields are color coded in the HEX data of Figure 4 .18 and their corresponding data types and descriptions follows: Tag 9 01 15 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 03 00 00
Samples Per Pixel, Short Data Type (16-bit unsigned integer), One Data Item with value of 3 meaning that three samples are used per pixel. In Tag 3 above each sample is defined as having 8-bits.
Tag 10 01 16 00 03 00 00 00 01 01 F4 00 00
Rows Per Strip, Short Data Type (16-bit unsigned integer), One Data Item with value of 500 meaning that strips have 500 rows each. Because we know from Tag 2 that the height is 500 pixels, we know that there is only one strip of raster data.
Tag 11 01 17 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 OB 71 BO Strip Byte Counts, Long Data Type (32-bit unsigned integer), One Data Item with value 750,000 meaning that the single strip of raster data uses 750,000 bytes. This is expected because the width of 500 and height of 500 yields 250,000 pixels, with each pixel requiring 3 bytes, requiring a total of 750,000 bytes in TIFF file that uses no compression. Following the fifteen tags identified, the next four bytes specify the offset to the next IFD (if one exists). In the case of the data in Figure 4 .18, the value of this offset is zero because there is no other TED. Bytes that follow the IFDs contain data pointed to by 1D tags and may contain data too large to fit within the 12-byte IFD Tag size limitation. This data appears at the end of test2.tif (Figure 3. 2) between offsets OB7272 and OB728F as illustrated by the bold case: hexadecimal values in Figure 4 . The bytes between offset 08 and offset OB71BO contain the image raster data. These are the bytes that make up the pixels we see on the screen when the image is displayed. The color channels in the TIFF file are organized as Red Green Blue (RGB).
Let us revisit the first part of image test2.tif (see Figure 3 .2) to describe some of the methods employed for steganalysis (See Figure 4 .20). In our example we will look at the raster data from Figure 4 .20 ranging from offset 08 to C1.
OFFSET
The color channels in the TIFF file are organized as Red Green Blue (RGB). The orientation of the pixels as they are stored in the file is from the upper left corner to the lower right corner of the image (see Figure 4 .21). Not all image formats share this property. For example a BMP image will look identical on the screen but is stored quite differently in the physical file. Pixel data in BMT images are stored within a file with orientation following from bottom to top. The first pixel in the image test2.tif (Figure 3. 2) begins at offset 08 (following the header) and has the RGB byte values of 6F 67 57. Our main goal is to determine whether a given image contains embedded information and, if it does, to possibly extract that information. If we assume that information is hidden in the pixel data (the spatial domain) and not in some transform coefficients (the frequency domain), then we are interested in analyzing a subset of the pixel data. The subset of interest is that which contains the hidden information. One of the most common subsets used in hiding techniques, as discussed above, is LSB substitution. The LSBs (the higher order the bit used, the easier the detection is) will be overwritten with the hidden information using this particular hiding technique.
Example---Pixel Walk LSB Insertion Technique:
We use as a detailed example yet another method of LSB steganography. This method only works for color images. We use this example in detail to discuss how steganography might be detected. (Note that the Kurak-McHugh method swaps entire bit planes of the embedded image with the cover image and hence is trivial to detect ---we will come back to this later.) The pixel walk LSB insertion technique is a cross between the Kurak-McHugh method and the NRL method. The information that is to be hidden in the image can be separated into a stream of individual bits. The simplest pixel walk LSB insertion technique hides the information in the pixel data as follows: one bit from the stream is inserted into the LSB of the red channel of the first pixel, replacing the original value but changing the byte value by no more than 1. The next bit from the stream is written to the LSB of the green channel of the first pixel. This is followed by writing the next bit from the stream to the blue channel of the first pixel, which is then followed by moving on to the next pixel and repeating the process until the bit stream is empty. Let us further describe some concepts used in selecting the subset of pixel data of interest. Offset describes how many bytes to ignore from the start of pixel data before beginning the process. If offset=2, then we ignore the first two bytes of pixel data and begin the process on the third byte (the B byte of pixel 1). Skip describes how many bytes to ignore (or skip) between bytes of interest. If offset=1 and skip=1, then we start the process on the second byte (G byte of pixel 1), ignore the third byte, process the fourth byte (R byte of pixel 2), ignore the fifth, and so on to the end of pixel data following this same pattern. We also use the term bit plane or bit level to describe which bit to take from every byte of interest. For instance, if offset=O, skip=2, and bit level=l, then we start on the first byte and process the first bit of every third byte. This is equivalent to saying that we will take the LSB of every byte in the red channel of the image.
The following four color-coded examples illustrate the terms offset, skip, and bit level by showing how the terms are used in practice. By comparing the values shown below to their representation in Table 1 , the meaning of each term should become clear. If we were going to analyze all the LSBs of an image, then we would analyze the subset of pixel data with offset=O, skip=O, and bit level=l, which corresponds to the orangecoded bits in the pixel data in the above table. That subset should contain all hidden information that was embedded in the image in the pixel walk manner described above. After the subset has been obtained it is just a series of bits that must be treated further to arrive at the original information as it was before it was hidden in the image. If we assume the original information is a series of bytes and that the bits were hidden from most-significant-bit to least-significant-bit, then we simply divide the captured bits into a series of consecutive groups of eight bits, allowing the first bit in each group to be the most significant bit. We then arrive at a series of bytes that is identical to the original information before it was hidden. This process is described below.
The simplest pixel walk LSB insertion technique hides one bit in the LSB of every byte of pixel data, starting at the first pixel of an image and continuing until the end of the data is reached. In the example from Table 1 above is from the image data for test2.fig (Figure 3.2) . There is no guarantee yet that this is an indication of information hiding, but it is unlikely that this pattern is natural. Therefore the pattern of bits raises suspicion and this image becomes suspect. We used the pixel walk LSB insertion method as an illustrative example. As it turns out, Figure 3 .2 is a stego image. 6 CSIS was not told this ahead of time. The steganographic method used was Kurak-McHugh, where the 2-LSBs of testl.tif replaced the 2-LSBs of the cover image embedded image (an image identical to test2.tif in the six high order bits) to form the stego image test2.tif. Therefore, the above steganalysis detected that the least bit plane had been manipulated. Of course other similar tests can determine more.
Methods Employed for Image Analysis
The following provides explanation of the methods we used in investigating the NRL test images:
Observing Histogram Anomalies: As a crude first step at analyzing a given file, we may use this technique to get a statistical illustration of a file's distribution of data. For every byte in a file, we enter the byte value (from 0 to 255) into a histogram. When complete, the frequency of occurrence of each value is known. By examining this histogram, statistical anomalies or trends may be identified. This evaluation may also suggest an appropriate set of more definitive follow up analysis and provides input for other tests.
Image Bit-Plane Separation: The idea behind this technique is that hiding methods embed information in only a subset of available data. In images, one potential subset is a single bit plane in the pixel data (e.g., using only the 2 nd order bit in every byte). This analytical technique involves separating the image into planes and relying on the HVS to detect patterns when viewing a representation of a single plane. We produce a new image that reduces the original image to only one of its bit planes. First, a bit level is selected so that only one bit in every byte is used. If the selected bit in the original byte is a 0, the byte value in the new image will be a 0. If the selected bit in the original byte is a 1, the byte value in the new image will be 255. This makes patterns more visible.
The output can be examined visually to determine if lower bit planes correlate with upper bit planes, or if lower bit planes contain some uncorrelated pattern that may indicate embedded information in the lower bit levels.
Data Subset Reconstruction:
The goal of this process is to select a subset of data within a suspect file and then to reconstruct the original hidden data from this subset. Of course, we will only succeed if we select the exact subset in which information was embedded because the entire subset of data is used in the reconstruction. The output of this process is a new file containing a concatenation of the bits contained in the extracted subset. In extracting the subset, we select up to eight bit levels, although if all eight were selected the result would be an identical byte-for-byte copy of the original file. It is more practical to select only the bits where information is likely to have been hidden. (Using high order bits is a sure way of being detected.) We may also use a byte offset from the start of the original file to avoid extracting bits from the file header in file types that have headers where information is unlikely to be hidden. If, for example, the lower two bits of every byte were used to store hidden information, then we could select these two bit levels and then proceed through the original file byte by byte, extracting only the lower two bits from each original byte and placing them in a new byte. Each new byte would be constructed from four original bytes using only the two lower bits from each byte. Other x 2 Testing: Analysis of non-image files can be accomplished with a process modified from the techniques mentioned above. The most important step is providing for a way to limit testing to data where information is expected to have been hidden. If we suspect that only a specific subset of bytes is being used to carry the hidden data, then only the values in those bytes should be entered into the histogram. Using an offset from the beginning of the file and allowing for bytes to be skipped within the file makes this possible.
5

Experimental Results
The analytic tests employed by CSIS upon receipt of the images from NRL were as follows:
1. Review the distribution of bits in each of the 8 levels of each color plane.
2. Review the statistical properties of the bits in the overall image and then within the bit planes. Methods include those mentioned above.
These two tests alone will direct the investigators to further actions. These tests can be used to discover the randomness of data in each of the bit planes. The existence of random data my lead one to expect encrypted data. Having a high number of unique colors with respect to the overall size of the images may be the result of embedded information. Also having a large number of colors differing by one bit per color channel may be the result of least significant bit (LSB) manipulation to hide data.
The images in Figure 5 .23a,...,h show the eight bit planes of testl.tif (see Figure 3 .1) and the images in Figure 5 .24a,...h show the eight bit planes from test2.tif (see Figure 3. 2). The colors of each level are enhanced for better observation. We can clearly see that the upper two bit planes ( Figure 5 .23g and h) are embedded into the lowest two bits of the image test2.tif ( Figure 5 .24g and h). This can also be detected by a statistical test such as the discrete Laplacian [5] .
All. Running further experiments in measuring the relationship between colors and near pixels, CSIS found that the testl.tif (Figure 3 .1) image seems to have been processed using a steganography tool that employs a LSB embedding technique. (In fact it was processed using the NRL method but we are suspicious that this was a false positive, with respect to the NRL method, perhaps due to some manipulation prior to NRL encoding any message. This suspicion is given weight due to the fact that CSIS could not detect the NRL method in any of the other test images.) We have not identified the tool, but the pattern is consistent with techniques similar to S-Tools when processing 24-bit images. It is possible that a 24-bit BMP file can be processed with a steganography tool and then converted to a lossless format such as the 24-bit TIFF files provided by NRL.
According to CSIS the images from That is there are bright spots in it. This is because instead of just modifying the R byte we modified all three colors to have the same value as the R byte, and thus the steganography becomes obvious (one should not even call it steganography in that case). If R is a high value, and all three colors are set to the same value the pixel then appears as a bright spot. This is why we only modify the R byte. The statistical methods employed by CSIS cannot detect the NRL method. This is not surprising. Statistical methods are excellent at detecting significant differences. Statistical tests fail (in all scientific/engineering fields) to detect small changes that are indistinguishable from noise. The NRL method adds the embedded message in as what passes for noise. The purpose of these statistical tests was to prove our hypothesis, and these tests were extremely worthwhile.
Stego channels share a common theme with covert channels---if what you are attempting to steganographically/covertly embed/transmit is "small," you can get away with it [4] . However, recent work by Fridrich, Goljan and Du demonstrate how single bit changes introduced to images that were originally stored as JPEG files could be detected [2] . This technique does not employ statistical analysis but instead looks for artifacts of JPEG image compression that survive into the spatial domain when a JPEG is realized as a bitmapped image. This approach may detect the NRL method; however, their technique requires strict constraints and would falsely identify slight modifications introduced accidentally or through normal image processing as being embedded messages. With this possibility in mind a new stego tool has been developed by NRL and the University of Florida [6] , that should allow modest size embedded messages in either a spatially realized bitmapped image, or in a JPEG, that would not fall into the detection measures proposed by Friedrich et al. Only time will tell since it is a continuing game of cat and mouse.
